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Introduction
Among instruments of international capital transfer, foreign direct investment (FDI) raises special interest for a number of reasons. FDI is commonly identified as a more stable vehicle of cross-border investment, relative to portfolio flows, hence exposing host countries to lower capital account volatility (OECD, 2001) . It is often associated with positive technology and/or human capital spillover from the source country to the host economy (see e.g. Damijan et al., 2003) . Being in principle related to productive activities, FDI can contribute to enlarge and reinforce the industrial structure of recipient countries, while at the same time enhancing the competitiveness of the source economies (Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004) . As FDI is generally considered beneficial for both the source and host economies, a great deal of research as well as policy debate has recently focused both on FDI attraction by nations and regions, and on the international activities of multinational firms (UNCTAD, 2005) . This observation is related to the two main puzzles in the literature on the allocation of international capital flows. The first is the 'Lucas puzzle' of scarce capital inflows into developing countries. Lucas (1990) has pointed out that the allocation patterns of international capital flows were not in line with the predictions of neoclassical growth models with capital mobility. These models predict that capital should flow where it is scarce to reap the benefits of high return at a given risk level, hence promoting growth and conditional convergence between rich and poor countries. In the literature, the Lucas puzzle can be partly accounted for by considering cross-country differences in human capital and infrastructure endowments. The empirical models that are used to explain this puzzle employ growth-type variables, such as factor endowments and educational attainment, and are often associated with "vertical" cost-oriented FDI (see Borezstein et al., 1998; Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004 , among others).
Another strand of empirical studies on international asset trade focus on country size as a determinant of market-oriented, "horizontal" FDI, and often adopt an adjusted version of the gravity model of international trade literature. The results from these studies led to the second puzzle, which recently came to be known as the 'distance puzzle': the empirical literature shows that increased distance deters FDI. 2 Although this finding might seem intuitive, it is contradictory to the portfolio allocation theory, according to which investors should try to maximise their returns while diversifying and minimising the systemic risk in their portfolios. In other words, if portfolio diversification motives were at play in the case of FDI, we would expect to see more direct investment in more distant locations, not in nearby markets as these markets are more likely to be correlated with the home market of the investor. In general, the global allocation of FDI flows indicates that investors follow neither high returns nor risk diversification. The distance puzzle, however, can be partly explained by information and transaction costs, and can be alleviated when the source and host countries share a common language and law. Gravity models of FDI, as of trade, are formulated to include standard variables, such as economic size, distance, and also recently bilateral telephone traffic (e.g. Loungani et al., 2002; Guerin, 2005) .
We draw on this literature in order to model the effect of democracy on North-South bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI). This is a relevant issue provided both democratic (Brazil, India) and autocratic emerging countries (China) have been among the largest FDI percipients in the last 15 years. Therefore, interesting questions are whether or not democracy has triggered more investment towards some of these countries; and whether or not non-democratic economies could have received (even) more FDI, or could have been targeted by some source countries that did not actually invested there. In principle, democracy may affect a host-country's attractiveness in two ways, first by raising the future path of factor productivity hence the expected return on investment (as suggested for instance by Persson and Tabellini, 2006b) ; second, by reinforcing property rights and reducing the risk of expropriation for foreign investors.
We show later how, by these two channels, democracy may affect inflows in a host economy both in the case of horizontal and of vertical FDI. The economics of institutions has been examined by many distinguished scholars (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000; Acemoglu et al., 2004) , but the use of institutional factors in FDI literature is relatively new (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2005; Busse, 2003; Busse and Hefeker, 2005 The next section contains a review of selected contributions to the literature on the determinants of FDI. Section three outlines our empirical methodology, and describes our 2 See Loungani et al. (2002). dataset. Econometric results are presented in section four, while final comments and issues for further research are discussed in section five.
Literature on the determinants of North-South FDI
The empirical literature on the determinants of foreign direct investment evolved over the last two decades in line with new theoretical models. The empirical literature that deals with aggregate FDI flows in a macroeconomic framework has concentrated on variables commonly used in models of international capital flows (e.g. market size, income, exchange rates, infrastructure, real wage differentials, etc.). Although these variables explain which country characteristics might attract FDI, the Lucas and the distance puzzles persist.
Wheeler and Mody (1992), Barro et al. (1995) as well as Manzocchi and Martin (1996) argue that the human capital factor plays an important role in explaining why capital does not flow from rich to poor countries, or why FDI might not be large enough to promote faster convergence. Zebregs (1998) examines the distribution of FDI flows across developing countries and finds that standard neoclassical models cannot explain the concentration of FDI inflows in a few developing countries.
The development of microeconomic foundations by multinational firms, stemming from the 'new trade theory', provided a theoretical explanation for the evidence that FDI would take place between countries that are similar in size and in relative endowments.
The gravity models of international trade, already very successful in explaining bilateral trade flows, have therefore gained popularity in explaining international investment flows as well. Although the use of gravity models is recent in the asset trade literature, it is quickly growing (Ghosh and Wolf, 1998; Eaton and Tamura, 1994; Di Mauro, 2000; Hausman and Fernandez-Arias, 2000; Chunlai, 1997; De Menil 1999; Wei 1997; Wei, 2000; and Portes and Rey, 2002) . Carstensen and Toubal (2003) and Razin et al. (2005) use modified gravity models to explain bilateral FDI flows. Loungani et al. (2002) question why gravity models work for asset flows, and attempt to explain the distance puzzle. Since it is less probable that 'distance' represents transport costs in the case of FDI, the negative relationship between distance and bilateral FDI flows has been interpreted as evidence of positive information costs to investment abroad. Therefore, the more recent empirical equations on the determinants of FDI have been augmented to include more direct measures of information costs, related to e.g. bilateral telephone traffic (Loungani et al., 2002; Guerin, 2005) . The negative sign for geographical distance is robust to the inclusion of such measures of information flows, however, hence the puzzle remains unsolved.
Although bilateral FDI flows can to some extent be explained by gravity-type models, it is hard to accept that the geographical location of a country alone may determine its attractiveness vis-à-vis foreign investors, and possibly its economic fortunes. Recently, a new strand of literature relates institutional factors to the FDI attractiveness of the host country. Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2005) examine the FDI impact of institutional quality and governance infrastructure in both host and source economies, using a set of 52 countries.
They find that institutions matter independently of GDP per capita. Overall, their results indicate that as institutional quality increases in a developing host country, this can help the host country catch up with the source countries. Using both cross-section and panel data analysis, Busse (2003) finds that democracy raises FDI inflows in emerging coutries. Busse and Hefeker (2005) explore the linkages between political risk, institutions and FDI. Their results suggest that government stability, the absence of internal conflict and ethnic tensions, basic democratic rights, and ensuring law and order are significant for FDI.
Our study is different from the previous ones in that we focus only on North-South FDI flows using bilateral gross data; we consider the information associated with zero entries in the bilateral FDI matrix with a non-linear empirical model; and we use a proxy for the political regime that has been previously used only in other fields of empirical economics.
Empirical methodology and data
As mentioned before, the underlying idea is very simple: democracy may affect a hostcountry attractiveness in two ways, first by raising the future path of factor productivity hence the expected dimension of the emerging market and the expected return on investment; second, by reinforcing property rights and reducing the risk of expropriation for foreign investors. By these two channels, democracy may affect inflows in a host economy both in the case of horizontal and of vertical FDI:
For horizontal bilateral FDI. a gravity-type model can be suggested:
where i=host; j= source country. We expect ρ, γ to be larger than one for scale effects, and δ to be positive. D is a dummy variable referred to the host county alone, assuming values zero for autocracy, and one for democracy. θ captures either expected productivity effects (see Persson and Tabellini, 2006b ) which might affect the dimension of the host country market; and/or expected property right effects (democracy might make expropriation less likely). If θ is positive, democracy leads to larger FDI inflows.
For vertical bilateral FDI, a growth-type approach could be the following:
where f k (.) are the marginal products of physical capital taken as proxies for the expected return on investment in the two countries. We expect τ and σ to be positive. As in equation (1), D is the democracy dummy, and we expect λ to be positive if democracy raises capital productivity and/or reinforces property rights in the host country.
Gravity models of trade (see for instance Egger, 2002; Antonucci and Manzocchi, 2006) and of FDI (Carstensen and Toubal, 2003; Guerin, 2005; Razin et al., 2005) are usually estimated in a static or dynamic log-log format.
3 If we take the log transformation of equations (1) and (2), and merge horizontal and vertical FDI as bilateral flow data do not distinguish between them, we obtain our empirical equation (3): ln(inflow ijt )= α ij +µ t + β 1 lnGDP it +β 2 lnGDP jt + β 3 lnGDPc it + β 4 lnGDPc jt + β 5 X ijt +u ijt (3) where inflow ijt, is bilateral gross FDI inflows from source country j to host country i at time t in constant 2000 US dollars. We use GDP of the host country at time t (GDP it ) and GDP of the source country at time t (GDP jt ,) as measures of the size of the markets; and we use per capita GDP of the source (GDPc jt ) and of the host country (GDPc it ) at time t as proxies of (the inverse of) per-worker capital endowments, which in turn proxy for the marginal product of physical capital. These variables are also in constant 2000 US dollars. The country-pair specific (random) effects, α ij, captures all the time-invariant factors, such as distance, common language, common legal origin, etc., while µ is a time dummy. Other controls, X ijt , include the log of bilateral trade (lagged to avoid possible endogeneity concerns); continent dummies (Latin America, Asia, Africa and Europe); educational attainments and EU dummy and privatization in the host countries. As for democracy, we ceteris paribus expect FDI to flow more to South host countries where political regimes are democratic. In this study, we use the measure of democracy suggested by Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) . We augment equation (3) to take account of a binary variable equals to one when the political regime is a democracy, zero otherwise.
When estimation is performed with longitudinal (panel) data, ordinary least squares lead to biased results if the individual country-effects are statistically significant, and are omitted from the model. In other words, whenever the intercept and/or the slopes of the 'true' regression are country-specific, and a linear specification is more suitable, then it is the fixed-effects or random-effects estimation method that produces unbiased and efficient results. The choice between a fixed-effects and a random-effects model depends on whether country parameters and control variables are orthogonal. Another consideration in the choice between the two is related to the shape of the panel: if the time-dimension of the panel is very large relative to the spatial dimension, then it is the fixed-effects that are consistent. However, panel datasets often consist of large crosssections observed over a short period of time, which is also our case (n=364 bilateral FDI flows; t=13 years). In this case, the fixed-effects estimator produces inconsistent results:
this is known in the literature as the 'incidental parameter' problem (Baltagi, 2001) .
FDI data, and especially North-South FDI data, present one specific problem namely a large number of zero observations in the bilateral flow matrix. This can be due to a number of reasons:
 reporting problems and measurement errors (in this case, linear models may account for that: see Razin et al., 2005) ;
 fixed costs in establishing and implementing FDI-related initiatives and projects, for instance due to administrative and financial requirements related to different legal systems. In this case, Razin et al. (2005) suggest that a Heckman selection model might be the most appropriate to study the determinants of bilateral FDI;
 indivisibilities in FDI flows, due either to the physical or human capital nature of the investment projects, or to reporting conventions (for instance, international institutions classify equity participations as FDI only if they exceed some percentage of the total company capital, say 10 or 20%).
If potential bilateral North-South flows do not always materialise due to investment indivisibilities, or are not recorded as actual FDI due to statistical conventions, it can well be that the reported entry of gross FDI inflow is zero, or even negative (e.g. in the case of large repatriated earnings from South to North country exceeding inflows of equity and intra-firm loans to emerging host countries). We adopt a non-linear empirical model that allows us to estimate a log-log equation without losing the information associated with negative and zero entries in the bilateral North-South FDI matrix. In order to keep the negative and zero observations, we follow Yeyati et al. (2003) and use a transformation of the gross inflows as the dependent variable (see Appendix A for details). We estimate our model by a random-effects tobit model that is left censored at zero (see Peracchi, 2004 ). 
Econometric results
We start with a simple model that includes the basic gravity-type variables for horizontal In order to check its robustness, in Table 2 An economic interpretation is that trade flows facilitate investment abroad resulting in reduced transaction costs as business relations are already in place. Not surprisingly, gravity-type variables such as the size of the host countries are not robust to the inclusion of lagged trade, while the economic significance of the source country size is reduced but statistically significant. Per capita GDP in the source country is significant at the 1% 6 The χ 2 test is designed for random-effect models to test whether the random effects from a panel tobit estimation are significant vis a vis pooled tobit. The time dummies are jointly significant, but the test level, with or without continent dummies, while the coefficient of the host country has the "wrong" sign.
In Table 3 , we make an attempt to account for the Lucas puzzle, and augment the benchmark equation by an index of human-capital endowment in host economies (education as proxied by average years of schooling in the total population of 25 and over). This is in line with theoretical and empirical research pointing to the role of human capital in enhancing productivity, and in raising the rate of return on physical capital given per capita income. Since our variable is only available for intervals of five years (see Barro and Lee, 2000) , the sample size is considerably smaller and the dependent variable is averaged over sub-periods. 7 Our previous results are robust to the inclusion of human capital endowments in the host countries. The GDP of both the source and host countries and the per capita GDP in the source country are significant. Average education in the emerging economies is positively and significantly correlated with FDI inflows, but this result is not robust to the inclusion of continent dummies (as if there were a regional bias in education standards). Interestingly, the coefficient of per capita GDP in the host country now turns negative (though not significant) as predicted by the neoclassical model with human capital.
In Table 4 , we introduce the democracy binary variable. We follow Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) who use a similar democracy dummy variable based on the index variable Polity2 from the POLITY IV Project. Polity2 is a composite index (ranging from results are not reported and are available upon request. 7 The sub-periods are 1992-1994, 1995-1999, and 2000-2004 . The data points for years of schooling are 1990, 1995 and 2000.
-10 to 10) that measures the quality of the democracy in a country. 8 Our dummy variable takes the value of 1 when the host country makes a permanent transition to democracy (i.e. with no further regime reversal during the observed period). For the date of transition to democracy, we choose the year when the Polity2 index starts taking values larger than zero. In order to check whether the effect of the political regime on FDI takes some time to materialize, we create dummy variables (democracy_1, democracy_2, democracy_3, democracy_4) that take value one if the democratic was in place more than one year ago (two years ago, three years ago and four years ago respectively), and zero for the year of the transition to democracy, and before.
Columns 1 and 2 show that, although a democratic regime in place in the current or previous year has a positive impact on FDI, these results are not statistically significant.
However, once democracy has been in place for more than two years (recall that all transitions to democracy in our dataset are permanent), its impact on FDI inflows in the democratic emerging country is large and statistically significant (columns 3 and 4, Table   4 ). The effect of the democratic regime on FDI is twofold: (1) it induces a surge in FDI inflows to those emerging markets who were already recipients of FDI, and (2) it is associated with an increased probability of receiving FDI inflows for those countries that were non-recipients before. After four years, the effect of democracy on FDI vanishes:
this might suggest that either democracy has a one-step effect on factor productivity after a while, or that risk-averse foreign investors watch for the new institutions to take root. 8 The Polity2 index is a composite index of the following underlying variables: competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, constraint on the chief executive, regulation of participation and competitiveness of political participation. 9 Most emerging host countries in our sample have undergone economic liberalization before democratic liberalization. Hence the statistical insignificance of the democracy dummy is not attributable to lack of economic liberalization.
In Table 5 , we introduce two additional control variables, privatization proceeds in the emerging economy, and EU accession negotiations. Privatization proceeds in constant US dollars is a proxy for the intensity of privatization programs in the emerging economy, and likely to be associated with FDI inflows for two reasons: first, it is a proxy for the (non-financial) assets that can be potentially acquired by foreign investors in the current year; second, it could be a proxy for the pro-market climate in the host country. The EU binary variable takes value one for the year an emerging country starts EU membership negotiations and afterwards (and zero for the period before). The European Commission and Council allow the start of official accession negotiations with an applicant emerging country only after this country has complied with three sets of so-called "Copenhagen criteria", which require a number of reforms leading to democracy and civil rights, the establishment of a sound market economy, and macroeconomic stabilisation. Hence, the EU dummy can be viewed as a comprehensive indicator of political and economic reform, which however has the disadvantage of being useful only for European countries.
On the one hand, Table 5 shows that privatization proceeds are always significantly associated with FDI inflows. On the other hand, the EU dummy is not significant once proxies for democracy and privatization, as well as continent dummies, are included. As far as the impact of the current democratic regime is concerned, we find a positive and significant effect once we control for privatization and EU negotiations. Hence, it seems no longer necessary for the democratic regime to be in place for at least two years to observe a relevant contribution to FDI inflows, possibly because privatization policies create both the opportunities and the climate for foreign investment to materialize.
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Finally, in Table 6 we examine the type of democracy, comparing the effect of a parliamentary regime vis-a-vis a presidential one. We restrict our country sample to host democratic countries only, and create a dummy variable that takes value one if a democracy is parliamentary, and zero if it is presidential. For the definition of parliamentary democracy (see Table A1 in the appendix) we follow Persson and Tabellini (2003) . Accordingly, a democracy is classified as parliamentary if the confidence of the legislative assembly is necessary for the survival of the executive even if an elected president is chief executive. Our results suggest that -across emerging economiesparliamentary democracies tend to receive larger FDI inflows compared to presidential democracies, and/or they are associated with higher probability of receiving FDI. This is true whether or not the EU dummy is included, provided one controls for privatization. A possible intepretation is that parliamentary democracy has a stronger positive effect than a presidential regime on trade liberalization (as suggested by Persson, 2005) , or on the protection of private property rights (presidential regimes could lead more frequently to partial nationalization of foreign assets). Hence, parliamentary democracies could have positive effects on FDI inflows to the South through these policies, if compared to presidential democracies. This is not necessarily in contrast with Persson and Tabellini (2006a) , who find that presidential democracy is more conducive to economic growth, for two reasons: first, the effect they suggest is also due to more sound fiscal policies, which might not however affect FDI; second, their sample of democratic regimes includes OECD countries as well. However, our results in Table 6 must be considered with   caution, as all EU candidate countries throughout 1992-2004 were parliamentary democracies, and they represent most of this sub-sample: so the parliamentary dummy is strongly collinear with the EU dummy, and the two could capture the same effect.
Final remarks
The literature on the economic effects of institutions and reform is growing rapidly, as it is the interest in explaining FDI flows by institutional factors. Nevertheless, the impact of democracy on FDI has been examined by only a few authors. We study the effect of they have been targeted by some source countries that did not actually invested there? We find that democracy in the host country has a positive effect of North-South FDI flows, although this effect materializes two years after the democratic regime is in place. This might point out to the need for foreign investors to build up confidence in the stability of the democratic process. When we control for privatization proceeds, however, democracy has an immediate positive effect, while the privatization program also has a significant impact on FDI. Finally, different forms of democracy in emerging countries seem to have different effect on FDI, although the limited extent of our country-sample lead us to interpret this finding with caution. Among democratic emerging markets, the ones that have adopted parliamentary forms of government (mostly EU candidate countries) both receive more FDI inflows and they are also more likely to receive FDI inflows. In order to assess the robustness of this results, more variability in the characteristics of the democratic regime across and within regions would be needed in the future. Another field of investigation to be pursued is that of defining "objective" measures of economic reform, in the sense of Campos and Horvath (2006) , for a large enough number of emerging countries such as to be able to assess the robustness of the democracy effect on FDI vis-a-vis those of other institutional and policy variables. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%.
APPENDIX A
In order to avoid the loss of valuable information, the dependent variable is transformed.
For large values of inflw it , ln (inflw it +1)  ln(inflw it ). For small values ln (inflw it +1)  inflw it , hence this transformation resembles a semi-log relationship. Different versions of this transformation were used by Eichengreen and Irwin (1996) , Eaton and Tamura (1994) and Wei (2000) . This transformation takes care of zero observations, leaving out negative observations of direct investment. Yeyati et al. (2003) offer a solution to this problem by the following transformation:
By this transformation, negative values are retained, and the coefficients from a linear regression can still be interpreted as elasticities for large values of the dependent variable.
For this reason, we measure FDI inflows in dollars (not millions) and hence adding 1 is equivalent to adding one dollar to gross inflows.
APPENDIX B
Our dataset includes 14 North source countries and 24 South host countries over 1992-2004 (336 cross-sections by 13 years).
List of countries in sample:
Source countries Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and US
